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Multiple-Quality Cournot Oligopoly and the Role of Market Size
Abstract: We model an oligopoly where firms can choose the quality level of their
products by incurring set-up costs that generally depend on the quality level. If the
set-up cost is independent of product quality, firms may choose to supply both types of
quality.We focus on the long run equilibrium where free entry and exit ensure that the
profit for each type of firm is zero. Using this framework, we study the implications
of an increase in the market size. We show that for the existence of an equilibrium
where some firms specialize in the low quality product it is necessary that the set-up
cost for the lower quality product, adjusted for quality level, is lower than that for
the higher quality product. In the case where the unit variable costs are zero, or they
are proportional to quality level (so that unit variable costs, adjusted for quality, are
the same), we show that an increase in the market size leads to (i) an increase in the
fraction of firms that specialize in the high quality products, (ii) the market shares (both
in value terms and in terms of volume of output) of high quality producers increases,
and (iii) the prices of both types of product decrease. In the case where higher quality
requires higher set up cost (per unit of quality) but lower unit variable cost (per unit
of quality), subject to certain bounds on the difference in unit variable costs, we obtain
the result that an increase in the market size decreases the number of low quality firms,
increases the number of high quality firms, and decreases the prices of both products.
In the special case where the set up cost is independent of the quality level, we find that
all firms will produce both type of quality levels. In this case, an increase in the market
size will reduce the value share of the low quality product, but will leave their volume
share unchanged; and the market expansion induces a fall in the relative price of the
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low quality product, and in the prices of both products in terms of the numeraire good.
We carry out an empirical test of a version of the model, where set-up costs now refer
to set-up costs to establish an export market, and they vary according to the quality
of the product that the firm exports to that market. We show that the data supported
the hypothesis that the average qualities are higher for bigger export markets.
JEL classifications: L10, L13, L19
Keywords: Multiproduct firms; Cournot competition; Vertical product differenti-
ation; Cost structure; Market size.
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1 Introduction
In many oligopolistic industries, firms supply a variety of products that differ mainly
in terms of quality. Some firms are known to specialize in products of high quality
while others occupy the lower end of the quality spectrum. The purpose of this paper
is to study the role of the market size on the average quality level of the vertically
differentiated products that an oligopolistic industry produces.
Trade liberalization is one of major factors that have contributed to the expansion
of market size. In the international trade literature, the effect of market size expansion
on consumers’ welfare has been largely studied using the monopolistic competition
framework, where firms produce horizontally differentiated products (Krugman, 1980;
Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Trefler, 2012), and trade gains are explained in terms of
the lowering of prices and the increase in the number of horizontally differentiated
product varieties that the average consumer has access to. The decrease in prices is
due to the expansion of the scale of operations of the representative firm, which reduces
the firm’s average cost. While the monopolistic competition framework is convenient,
the CES utility function assumed in this literature (e.g., Melitz, 2003) produces the
counterfactual result that the ratio of equilibrium price over the constant unit variable
cost is a constant, independent of the market size. This is contrary to the empirical
evidence, see, e.g. Edmond et al. (2015). In our paper, we assume instead that firms
are oligopolists and study the long run equilibrium of an industry that produces both
high and low quality products. The mark-up is not constant in our model.1
1Long et al. (2011) examine the long run equilibrium in a model where firms are oligopolists with ex-
ante cost heterogeneity. Their paper however assumes that the all the firms in the industry produce the
same homogenous product. Our paper distinguishes low quality products from high quality products.
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Our model is built on Johnson and Myatt (2006), where firms can choose the quality
levels from a discrete set {S1, S2, ..., Sm}, and they compete in quantities, taking the
inverse demand function for each quality type as given. However, we replace their
assumption that all firms incur the same set-up cost (regardless of the quality of the
product that firms offer) with a more plausible one: firms that wish to specialize in the
lower quality product incur a lower set-up cost than that of firms that produce the high
quality product. In addition, while Johnson and Myatt (2006) are mainly concerned
with the short run equilibrium, where the number of firms are fixed, the focus of our
model is the long run equilibrium, where free entry and exit ensures that profit is zero.
Using this framework, we study the implications of an increase in the market size.
We show that for the existence of an equilibrium where some firms specialize in the
low quality product it is necessary that the set-up cost for the lower quality product,
adjusted for quality level, is lower than that for the higher quality product. In the
case where the unit variable costs are zero, or they are proportional to quality level (so
that unit variable costs, adjusted for quality, are the same), we show that an increase
in the market size leads to (i) an increase in the fraction of firms that specialize in
the high quality products, (ii) the market shares (both in value terms and in terms
of volume of output) of high quality producers increases, and (iii) the prices of both
types of product decrease. In the case where higher quality requires higher set up
cost (per unit of quality) but lower unit variable cost (per unit of quality), subject to
certain bounds on the difference in unit variable costs, we obtain the results that each
firm will choose will specialize in only one quality level, and that an increase in the
market size decreases the number of low quality firms, increases the number of high
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quality firms, and decreases the prices of both products. In the special case where the
set up cost is independent of quality level, we find that all firms will produce both
quality levels. In this case, an increase in the market size will reduce the value shares
of low quality products, but will leave their volume share unchanged; and the market
expansion induces a fall in the relative price of the low quality product, and in the
prices of both products in terms of the numeraire good.
We carry out an empirical test of a version of the model, where set-up costs now
refer to set-up costs to establish an export market, and they vary according to the
quality of the product that the firm exports to that market. We show that the data
supported the hypothesis that the average prices of the products are lower for bigger
export markets, and the market share of the high quality product is increasing in the
market size.
This paper is related to the theoretical work of Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman
(2011) concerning quality differentiation in international trade between the North (the
rich countries) and the South (the poor countries). However, while our model assumes
oligopoly (i.e. firms choose their strategies and are aware of strategic interactions among
them), the model of Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011) assumes monopolistic
competition (i.e., there are no strategic interactions among firms). Under oligopoly,
each firm knows that the quantities and/or qualities chosen by its rivals depend on their
knowledge of the firm’s cost and strategy. In contrast, under monopolistic competition,
each firm takes as given the market aggregates (such as aggregate expenditure on the
products of the industry, and the industry price level), and sets its own price, as if it
were a monopolist. In Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011) firms set prices,
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each assuming that its price has no effects on the industry’s price index (this is the
standard assumption of the monopolistic competition model). In our model, each firm
decides on its output, knowing that its output will affect the industry’s output and
hence prices. Another difference between our model and Fajgelbaum, Grossman and
Helpman (2011) is that we assume that the market is not fully covered, i.e., there are
some consumers that do not buy the product of the industry under study: they spend
their entire income on the numeraire good which is produced by a perfectly competitive
sector. As pointed out by Motta (1993, page 116) and others, the assumption that the
market is not fully covered is made so that the inverse demand functions for various
quality levels can be derived from the consumers’ demand. In contrast, in Fajgelbaum,
Grossman and Helpman (2011) there is no need to have inverse demand functions, as
firms set prices directly. Another major difference is that in Fajgelbaum, Grossman
and Helpman (2011) the marginal rate of substitution between the quality (of the
differentiated goods) with the quantity of the numeriare good depends on the level of
income. (We will discuss this in more details in the next section).
2 A brief literature review
This section provides a brief review of the literature on oligopoly with vertically differ-
entiated products. There are two canonical approaches regarding the costs of producing
higher quality products. The first approach assumes that to produce a higher quality
product, a firm must pay a higher fixed cost, while the variable costs are independent
of quality level. The fixed costs may be regarded as R&D costs. The second approach
assumes that to produce a higher quality product, the firm must incur higher variable
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cost per unit of output, and there are no fixed costs. This corresponds to situations
where production of higher quality goods require the use of more qualified labor or
more expensive intermediate inputs. The first approach was adopted by authors such
as Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1984), Bonanno (1986), Ireland (1987), Motta (1993,
Part II). Studies using the second approach includes Mussa and Rosen (1987), Gal-Or
(1983), Champsaur and Rochet (1989), Motta (1993, Part III), and Johnson and Myatt
(2006).
Concerning the mode of competition, most authors assume Bertrand competition
with heterogeneous consumers. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1989, 1980) and Shaked and
Sutton (1982, 1983) consider a duopoly where one firm produces the high quality prod-
uct and the other firm produces the low quality product, and the firms compete by
setting the prices. Champsaur and Rochet (1989) also restrict attention to a duopoly
with Bertrand competition, but allow each firm to be a multi-product firm. (See also
Tirole,1988, and Choi and Shin, 1992, for Bertrand competition in the case where the
market is fully covered.) A number of authors assume quantity competition (Bonanno,
1986, Gal-Or, 1983, Johnson and Myatt, 2006). Motta (1993) consider both types of
competition. Most authors assume that the number of firms are fixed, though John-
son and Myatt (2006) also discuss the long run equilibrium when free entry eliminates
excess profit.
Concerning the choice of quality levels, many authors assume that firms can choose
any level of quality in a continuum [Smin, Smax]. Johnson and Myatt (2006), in contrast,
assume firms must choose quality levels from a discrete set, {S1, S2, ..., Sm}, and they
use the upgrade approach: each firm can upgrade a low quality product to a higher
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quality product by incurring an upgrade cost (a variable cost, not a fixed cost). It is
as if the firm must produce an additional component to turn a low quality unit into a
higher quality unit. The authors make direct assumptions on the consumers’ valuation
of upgrades. In their model, upgrading involves an increase in the marginal cost, but
no increase in fixed costs: whether a firm produces a low quality product, or a high
quality product, or both, the fixed cost is the same.
In our paper, we take a more general approach: high quality products may involve
both higher fixed costs (e.g. more expensive plants and other overhead costs), as well
as higher variable costs, even though we also consider the special case where the fixed
costs are independent of product quality.
On the specification of demand, the typical specification is that each consumer buys
at most one unit of the product.2 This seems a reasonable specification for products such
as cars, smart phones, computers, etc. It is assumed that consumers are heterogeneous
with respect to a taste parameter θ. A consumer of type θ has the net utility function
uθ = θS − p where S is the quality of the product, and p is its price. The parameter θ
can also be interpreted as the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between income
and quality, so that a higher θ corresponds to a lower marginal utility of income; in other
words, a consumer with a higher income would have a higher θ (see Tirole, 1988, p. 96).
Indeed, in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980), Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1984),
Bonanno (1986), and Ireland (1987), consumers are supposed to be heterogeneous in
terms of income.
2In a different class of models, consumers are identical and and buy more than one unit, see Sutton
(1991) and Motta (1992a, 1992b). In these models, under Cournot competition, firms will choose the
same quality.
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A simple formulation is that there are only two firms in the industry (Motta, 1993):
one firm (say firm 1) produces the high quality product, while the other produces the
low quality product. Motta (1993) assumes that the market is not fully covered, i.e., in
equilibrium, some set of consumers will choose not to purchase, because their θ is too
low relative to the price of either product.3
Motta (1993, part I) assumes that fixed cost is quadratic in quality: for any quality
level S in the continuum of feasible qualities [Smin,Smax], the associated fixed cost is FS =
S2/2. This implies that the quality-adjusted fixed cost, fS ≡ (1/S)FS, is S/2, and thus
the quality-adjusted fixed cost increases in quality level, i.e., if SH > SL then fSH =
SH/2 > fSL ≡ SL/2. (In our paper, we do not restrict to the quadratic specification).
Under this assumption, Motta (1993) considers a two-stage games between two firms.
In the first stage, they choose the quality level (and incur the associated fixed cost),
and in the second stage, they compete as two Cournot rivals (or alternative, as two
Betrand rivals). Motta (1993) finds that when both firms know they will compete as
Cournot rivals, their quality differentiation will be relatively small (the ratio of high
quality to low quality is about 2) while if they know they will compete as Bertrand
rivals, they will choose quality levels that are further apart (the ratio of high quality to
low quality is about 5). The intuition behind this result is that since price competition
tends to be fiercer than quantity competition (for any given pairs of quality levels), the
firms will try to differentiate their products more to reduce rivalry.4 The result that
3As pointed out by Motta (1993), if the market is fully covered, then total demand is independent of
the prices, and thus the demand functions cannot be inverted, and hence one cannot consider Cournot
competition. Note that if the lowest θ is zero, then it is automatically true that the market is not fully
covered.
4If the fixed costs are zero, or do not increase too much with quality, and variable costs are zero,
and the upper bound Smax is low, so that at Smax the marginal cost of quality is lower than the
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Bertrand firms tend to have greater vertical differentiation of quality is robust: if costs
of quality improvements are variable costs rather than fixed costs, the same principle
applies.5
Concerning profits in the case of where the quality-adjusted fixed costs increase
with quality, Motta (1993) finds that in the case of duopoly, the sum of profits is higher
under Bertrand rivalry.6 However, this result is reversed if quality improvement involve
higher variable costs rather than higher fixed costs. Under either specification of the
costs of quality, consumers are always better off under Bertrand competition.
Gal-Or (1983, 1985, 1987) and Motta (1993, Part III) study Cournot competition
when quality improvements involve an increase in variable costs. While Gal-Or (1983)
assumes in her model that qualities and quantities are simultaneously chosen, Motta
(1993, Part III) assumes two stage competition. Motta (1993) assumes that the unit
variable cost, adjusted for quality, is increasing in quality level, and finds that the firms
will choose to be different: a low quality firm and a high quality firm. This result is
consistent with those of Gal-Or (though she uses a slightly different utility function).
Finally, we should mention a related paper with vertical product differentiation
which assumes monopolistic competition instead of oligopoly. Its authors, Fajgelbaum,
Grossman and Helpman (2011), consider an equilibrium model where firms choose
among vertically differentiated product qualities, and horizontally differentiated vari-
marginal revenue of quality, the two Cournot firms will both choose the highest quality level, Smax.
See Bonanno (1982) and Ireland (1987, pp.71-74).
5Under Bertrand competition, Shaked and Sutton (1982) show that if there are neither fixed costs
nor variable costs, the two firms will choose two different quality levels, S1 = Smax and S2 is higher
than Smin. In Shaked and Sutton (1984), if fixed costs exist and are strongly increasing in quality
level, then S1 < Smax.
6This is in sharp constrast to Vives (1985) who showed that Bertrand firms earn lower profits than
Cournot firms (under the assumption that product specifications are exogenous).
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eties. They assume that in equilibrium, each firm chooses only one quality level q,
where q belongs to a finite set Q ≡ {q1, q2, ..., qm}.7 For any given q, there is a discrete
set of varieties Jq. Each firm that has chosen quality level q must decide which variety
in the given set Jq it wants to specialize in. By definition of monopolistic competition,
each firm believes that its price does not affect the demand facing any other firm.
Each consumer h has a given income, yh, and must allocate this income between a
perfectly divisible and homogeneous numeraire good and one unit of the differentiated
good. This unit can be of any quality q ∈ Q, and can be of any variety j ∈ Jq. The
price of the chosen variety, denoted by pj, is set by firm j ∈ Jq. The consumer pays pj
for the unit of the differentiated good, and thus her expenditure on the numeraire good
is yh − pj. Call z this expenditure on the numeraire good. The utility of the consumer
is assumed to be
uh = zq + εhj where j ∈ Jq
where εhj is her idiosyncratic evaluation of the attributes of variety j. Each individual
h has a vector
εh ≡ (εh1 , εh2 , ..., εhF )
where F is the number of firms in the industry. The multiplicative term zq indicates
that the marginal utility of quality depends on how many units of the homogeneous
good she consumes, which of course depends on her income. This formulation implies
that a person with a higher income will value quality more.8 It is assumed that the
vectors ε are independently distributed according to a generalized extreme value (GEV)
7In the simplest case, the set Q consists of only two quality levels, so that Q ≡ {H,L}.
8This multiplicative formulation makes this paper different from the additive formulation in the
industrial organization literature, which follows McFadden (1978) and Berry et al. (1995).
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distribution, as in McFadden (1978). For example, if there are two quality levels, H and
L, and within each level, there are two product varieties, then the GVE distribution is
G(ε) = e
−
(
e−(ε1/θH)+e−(ε2/θH)
)θH
× e−
(
e−(ε
′
1/θL)+e−(ε
′
2/θL)
)θL
where 0 < θH < 1 and 0 < θL < 1.
More generally,
G(ε) = exp
{
−
∑
q∈Q
χq
}
where
χq ≡
∑
j∈Jq
η
1/θj
j
θj and ηj ≡ e−εj , j ∈ Jq
It can be shown that under this GEV distribution, the following results hold:
(i) among all consumers who buy a product with quality q, the the percentage who
buys variety j in Jq is
ρj|q =
(
e−qpj/θq
) [ 1∑
i∈Jq e
−qpi/θq
]
(1)
(ii) among all consumers with income y, the fraction who buy quality q is
ρq(y) =
∑
i∈Jq
e−(y−pi)q/θq
θq × 1∑
ω∈Q
[∑
i∈Jω e
−(y−pi)ω/θω
]θω (2)
(iii) among all consumers with income y, the fraction who choose variety j with
quality q is , for j ∈ Jq,
ρj(y) = ρj|q × ρq(y) (3)
Under monopolistic competition, a firm j that produces quality q will set pj while
assuming that this will have no effect on the term inside the square brackets on the
right-hand side of eq. (1), and no effect on any term in equation (2). Fajgelbaum,
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Grossman and Helpman (2011) assume that θq is increasing in q. Under this assumption,
and standard assumptions on production costs, they show that richer countries export
higher quality goods. This result is consistent with our model, where we show that a
country with a bigger market size tends to produce higher average quality and lower
average price. However, in our model, the equilibrium mark-up on unit variable cost is
not a constant, which is a well documented fact (Edmond et al., 2015).
3 The basic model
We consider an oligopoly with vertically differentiated products. Specifically, for sim-
plicity, we assume there are on two quality levels, denoted by SL and SH , where
0 < SL < SH .
9 In this section, we consider the simplest case: we assume for the
moment that a firm must either produce a high quality product, or a low quality prod-
uct, but not both, and they incur different set-up costs: a firm that wishes to produce a
high quality product must incur a higher set-up cost. In imposing (in this section) the
restriction that each firm is a single-product firm, our basic model is similar to Gab-
szewicz and Thisse (1989, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983); however while
these authors assume that firms compete as Bertrand rivals, i.e., they set prices, in our
model we assume firms are Cournot rivals, i.e., they choose quantities.
In adopting Cournot competition, we follow Johnson and Myatt (2006). However,
our model differs from Johnson and Myatt (2006) in two important respects. First,
Johnson and Myatt (2006) assume that all firms have the same fixed cost, regardless
of the quality they produce. In contrast, in our model, we focus on the more plausible
9In this paper, we follow the approach of Johnson and Myatt (2006) in that we do not address the
issue of how SH and SL are determined. The set of quality levels is discrete and given.
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case where the fixed costs depend on the quality level: firms that produce the high
quality product must incur a higher fixed cost. The difference in fixed costs play an
important role in our model. Our main focus is to determine the equilibrium prices
and quantities, and the long-run equilibrium number of firms. Second, Johnson and
Myatt (2006) didn’t investigate the impacts of the change of market conditions on the
equilibrium results while our study analyzes the role of the market size in affecting the
equilibrium results.
3.1 Consumers
We assume there is a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. They differ from each
other in terms of their intensity of preference for quality, which is represented by a
parameter θ, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ. Let G(θ) denote the fraction of consumers whose
intensity of preference is smaller than or equal to θ. We assume that G(0) = 0, G(θ) = 1
and G′(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (0, 1).
Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. She must decide whether to
buy one unit of the high quality product, or one unit of the low quality product, or
she does not buy any. A consumer of type θ places a value θSH on the consumption
of a unit of the high quality product, and a value θSL on the consumption of a unit
of the low quality product. Let PH (respectively, PL) denote the market price of the
high quality product (respectively, low quality product). Her net utility is θSH −PH or
θSL − PL, depending on which product she buys. If she does not buy either product,
her net utility is zero. We assume that PH > PL. Let us define the following ratios:
θL ≡ PL
SL
, θH ≡ PH
SH
, θI ≡ PH − PL
SH − SL (4)
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In what follows, we assume that equilibrium prices are such that 0 < θL < θH < θI <
θ.10 It is easy to show that
PH − PL
SH − SL >
PH
SH
⇐⇒ PL
SL
<
PH
SH
A consumer whose θ equals θL is indifferent between not buying the good and buying
one unit of the low quality product at the price PL. Similarly, a consumer whose θ equals
θL is indifferent between not buying the good and buying one unit of the high quality
product at the price PH . And a consumer with θ = θI will be indifferent between the
two alternative purchases.
The fraction of the population who purchases the high quality product is G(θ) −
G(θI), the fraction who purchases the low quality product is G(θI) − G(θL), and the
fraction who does not buy the good is G(θL) > 0.
3.2 Producers
We assume that any firm that wants to produce the high quality product must incur an
upfront cost (or set-up cost) FH , and any firm that wants to produce the low quality
product must incur FL, where 0 < FL < FH . These are entry costs to the market.
They may correspond to the cost of purchasing equipment, or possibly R&D costs. In
this section, we assume that a firm that incurs FH can only produce the high quality
product, and a firm that incurs FL can only produce the low quality product. After
entry, firms choose their output level and compete as Cournot rivals. The marginal
production costs for high and low quality products are CH and CL respectively. We
assume that the marginal cost of a product is lower than its valuation by the consumer
10For example, if θ = 2, SL = 1, SH = 2, PL = 1, PH = 2.2 then θL = 1, θH = 1.1, θI = 1.2
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with the highest θ:
CH < θSH and CL < θSH
We will solve for both the short-run and the long-run equilibrium. In the short-run,
the numbers of firms of each types are fixed at nL and nH , and there are no entry nor
exit: the firms have incurred their set-up costs FL and FH , and they make their output
decisions, competing as Cournot rivals. We solve for the Cournot equilibrium output of
each type of product, and the resulting short-run equilibrium prices PH and PL. Gross
profits (before subtracting the entry costs) can then be calculated. In the long run, free
entry and exit implies that the net profit of each firm is zero. The zero-profit conditions
determine the long-run equilibrium number of firms. (As usual in this literature, we
ignore the integer problem.)
3.3 Short-run Cournot equilibrium with two types of firms
In the short run, we take nH and nL as given. Cournot rivalry means that firms
determine their outputs, knowing that the market prices will be determined by the
industry outputs of each product. Firms take the inverse demand functions as given.
Let us specify the inverse demand functions.
3.3.1 The inverse demand functions
Let N denote the mass of consumers. Given the prices PL and PH , we can compute
θI and θL as functions of (PL, PH). The number of consumers who demand the high
quality product is
XH = N
[
G(θ)−G(θI(PL, PH))
]
(5)
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and the number of consumers who demand the low quality product is
XL = N [G(θI)−G(θL(PL, PH))] (6)
From these demand functions, we can compute the inverse demand functions
PH = PH(XH , XL) (7)
PL = PL(XH , XL) (8)
In order to obtain an explicit solution, let us assume that the distribution of θ is
uniform over the interval
[
0, θ
]
. Then
G(θ) = θ/θ for θ ∈ [0, θ]
Equations (5) and (6) become
XH = N
[
θ
θ
− θI
θ
]
=
N
θ
[
θ − PH − PL
SH − SL
]
(9)
XL = N
[
θI
θ
− θL
θ
]
=
N
θ
[
PH − PL
SH − SL −
PL
SL
]
(10)
These equations yield the inverse demand functions
PH =
(
1− XH
N
)
θSH − XL
N
θSL (11)
PL =
(
1− XH
N
− XL
N
)
θSL (12)
Then
∂PH
∂XH
= −θSH
N
,
∂PH
∂XL
= −θSL
N
,
∂PL
∂XL
=
∂PL
∂XH
= −θSL
N
(13)
Notice that a unit increase in the output XH affects PL the same way as a unit increase
in the output XL. In contrast, the effect of a unit increase in XH on PH is stronger
that of XL on PH .
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3.3.2 The output decision and market equilibrium in the short run
Let xiH denote the output of the high-quality firm i, and X
−i
H denote the sum of outputs
of all other high-quality firms. The high-quality firm i chooses xiH to maximize its profit,
taking X−iH and XL as given
maxpiiH = x
i
H
[
PH(X
−i
H + x
i
H , XL)− CH
]
(14)
The first order condition for an interior equilibrium is11
[
PH(X
−i
H + x
i
H , XL)− CH
]
+ xiH
∂PH(X
−i
H + x
i
H , XL)
∂XH
= 0 (15)
Similarly, for any low-quality firm j, the corresponding first order condition is
[
PL(XH , X
−j
L + x
j
l )− CL
]
+ xjL
∂PL(XH , X
−j
L + x
j
L)
∂XL
= 0 (16)
In a symmetric equilibrium, xiH = (1/nH)XH and x
j
L = (1/nL)XL. Substituting into
the two first order conditions, we obtain a system of two equations that determines the
equilibrium outputs, X∗H and X
∗
L, for given nL and nH
[PH(XH , XL)− CH ] + XH
nH
∂PH(XH , XL)
∂XH
= 0 (17)
[PL(XH , XL)− CL] + XL
nL
∂PL(XH , XL)
∂XL
= 0 (18)
Thus the optimal output of the representative high-quality firm and that of the low
quality firms are
x∗H =
[PH(X
∗
H , X
∗
L)− CH ]
−∂PH(X∗H ,X∗L)
∂XH
, x∗L =
[PL(X
∗
H , X
∗
L)− CL]
−∂PL(X∗H ,X∗L)
∂XL
(19)
11We restrict attention to interior equilibrium outputs for simplicity.
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Substituting (19) into the profit function (14) we can expressed the firm’s profit in
terms of its equilibrium output:
pi∗H = −
∂PH(X
∗
H , X
∗
L)
∂XH
(x∗H)
2 =
θSH (x
∗
H)
2
N
, pi∗L = −
∂PL(X
∗
H , X
∗
L)
∂XL
(x∗L)
2 =
θSL (x
∗
L)
2
N
(20)
Substituting into (17) and (18) yields the following system of equations(
1− XH
N
)
θSH − XL
N
θSL − CH = θSH
N
XH
nH
(21)
(
1− XH
N
− XL
N
)
θSL − CL = θSL
N
XL
nL
(22)
Dividing both sides of eq. (21) by θSH/NnH and both sides of eq. (22) by θSL/NnL,
we obtain
nHN(1− cH)− nNXH − knHXL = XH (23)
nLN(1− cL)− nHXH − nLXL = XL (24)
where
cH ≡ CH
θSH
< 1, cL ≡ CL
θSL
< 1 and k ≡ SL
SH
< 1 (25)
Solving, we obtain the equilibrium outputs as functions of cL, cH , k, nL, nH and N
X∗H = nHN
((1− cH)(1 + nL)− k(1− cL)nL)
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL (26)
X∗L = nLN
((1− cL)(1 + nH)− (1− cH)nH)
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL (27)
Substituting the equilibrium outputs into equations (11) and (12) we obtain the equi-
librium prices
P ∗H =
[
1− 1
N
X∗H −
k
N
X∗L
]
θSH
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P ∗L =
[
1− 1
N
X∗H −
1
N
X∗L
]
θSL
Each high-quality firm’s equilibrium output is
x∗H =
X∗H
nH
=
N((1− cH)(1 + nL)− k(1− cL)nL)
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
and, using (20), its profit is
pi∗H = θSHN
(
(1− cH)(1 + nL)− k(1− cL)nL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)2
(28)
Similarly,
pi∗L = θSLN
(
(1− cL)(1 + nH)− (1− cH)nH
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)2
(29)
3.4 The long-run free-entry equilibrium
In the long-run equilibrium, free entry and exit ensure that each firm’s net profit is
zero. The zero-profit conditions determine the number of high-quality producers and
low-quality producers. To solve for the equilibrium number of firms nL and nH , we
equate the profit (before subtracting the fixed cost) for each of type of firm with the
corresponding fixed cost:
pi∗H = FH
pi∗L = FL
Using the definitions
fH =
FH
θSH
and fL =
FL
θSL
the zero profit conditions become(
(1− cH)(1 + nL)− k(1− cL)nL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)2
=
fH
N
(30)(
(1− cL)(1 + nH)− (1− cH)nH
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)2
=
fL
N
(31)
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3.4.1 The special case when quality-adjusted marginal costs are the same
for both products
In this sub-section, we solve for the long-run equilibrium number of firms of each type,
under the assumption that the quality-adjusted marginal costs are identical, cH = cL =
c. Then
(nL − knL + 1)2
(nH + nL + nHnL(1− k) + 1)2
=
fH
(1− c)2N (32)
1
(nH + nL + nHnL(1− k) + 1)2
=
fL
(1− c)2N (33)
Dividing the first equation by the second equation, we get
(nL − knL + 1)2 = fH
fL
≡ β
i.e.
nL(1− k) + 1 =
√
β
Thus
nL =
√
β − 1
1− k (34)
Notice that nL > 0 if and only if fH > fL.
Next, use (33) to get
nH (1 + (1− k)nL) + (nL + 1) = (1− c)
√
N
fL
nH =
(1− c)(1− k)√N + (k −√β)√fL
(1− k)√βfL
(35)
3.4.2 Main results for the basic model
For ease of reference, we state the following three lemmas.
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Lemma 1 (The case where marginal production costs are proportional to
product quality)
Assume cH = cL = c ≥ 0. In the long run equilibrium (zero profits for both types of
firms),
(i) the low quality product is supplied (nL > 0) only if FH/SH > FL/SL, i.e., the
set-up cost per unit of quality is increasing in quality level.
(ii) an increase in the market size, N , will increase the number of high-quality firms
but leave the number of low-quality firms unchanged.
The total number of firms in the long-run equilibrium is
nL + nH =
(1− c)(1− k)√N + (k −√β)√fL + (
√
β − 1)√βfH
(1− k)√βfL
Clearly the total number of firms increases in the market size. The ratio of number of
low-quality firms to the total number of firms is
RL =
√
βfL(
√
β − 1)
(1− c)(1− k)√N + (k −√β)√fL + (
√
β − 1)√βfL
This ratio decreases in N .
The ratio of the number of high-quality firms to the total number of firms is RH =
1−RL, and it increases in the market size.
Now consider the quantities sold. From (26) and (27) the total quantity sold is
X∗H +X
∗
L = (1− c)N
(nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL)
1 + (nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL)
The ratio of X∗L to total quantity sold is
ML =
X∗L
X∗H +X
∗
L
=
1
nH
nL
+ 1 + (1− k)nH
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Since nL does not change with N , and nH increases in N , we conclude that ML falls as
N increases. Thus we can state:
Lemma 2: Assume cL = cH = c, and fH > fL. As the market size increases, the
share of high-quality firms, nN/(nH +nL), increases, and so does their market share in
quantity terms, X∗H/(X
∗
H +X
∗
L)
What about the market share in value terms?
Lemma 3: Assume cL = cH = c and fH > fL. The equilibrium prices in the
long-run equilibrium are:
PL = θSL
(
1
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)
=
θSL
(1− c)
√
fL
N
(36)
PH = θSH
(
1 + (1− k)nL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL
)
=
θSH
(1− c)
√
fH
N
(37)
They fall as the market size expands. However their ratio, PH/PL, is independent of
the market size, N :
PH
PL
=
(
SH
SL
)√
fH
fL
>
(
SH
SL
)
> 1
The market share of low-quality sales is
PLXL
PHXH + PLXL
=
knL
nH (nL(1− k) + 1)2 + knL
=
knL
nHβ + knL
(38)
As the market size N increases, nH increases but nL is unchanged, and the market
share of low-quality sales (in value terms) decreases.
Proof: omitted.
From Lemmas 1 to 3, we can state
Proposition 1 Assume the marginal cost per unit of quality is constant, i.e., cH =
cL = c, and fH > fL. In a Cournot oligopoly with free entry and exit, in equilibrium the
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relative price PL/PH is independent of the market size. As the market size increases,
the prices PL and PH both decrease by the same proportion, and the market share (in
value terms) of the high quality product increases. Welfare of each type of consumer
increases.
Remark Welfare increases because the prices fall. The fraction of the market served
by the oligopoly rises, because θL ≡ PL/SL falls. The fraction of the market that is
supplied by the high-quality producer rises, because θI ≡ (PH − PL)/(SH − SL) falls,
while PL/PH is unchanged. In fact, in the long run equilibrium (with free entry and
exit), we have
PH
PL
=
(
SH
SL
)
(1 + nL (1− k)) (independent of N)
XL
XH
=
nL
nH + (1− k)nHnL (falls as N rises)
θI =
PH − PL
SH − SL =
(
1+nL(1−k)
k
− 1
)
PL
SH − SL (falls as N rises)
4 Commitment to product lines
In the preceding section, we considered a Cournot oligopoly with both high and low
quality products, under the assumption that a firm produces either the high quality
product, or the low quality product, but not both.
We now relax that single-product-firm assumption, and allow each firm to decide
whether to produce both quality levels, or only one. The solution turns out to depend
on the relationship among the technological parameters, namely the fixed costs per unit
of quality, FH/SH and FL/SL, and the unit variable costs per unit of quality, CH/SH
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and CL/SL. In what follows, we consider only two cases. In Case 1, we assume that the
technology has the following properties: (i) CH ≥ CL, and (ii) higher quality requires
higher fixed cost per unit of quality but involves lower unit variable cost per unit of
quality, i.e.,
FH
SH
≥ FL
SL
and
CH
SH
≤ CL
SL
(39)
The assumption that CH ≥ CL and eq. (39) imply CL/SH ≤ CH/SH ≤ CL/SL.
In Case 2, we assume that (a) FH = FL = F > 0, which implies that FH/SH <
FL/SL, and (b) CH/SH > CL/SL. Note that Johnson and Myatt (2006) assume FH =
FL = F throughout their analysis.
As before, we define
fH =
FH
θSH
, fL =
FL
θSL
, cH =
CH
θSH
, cL =
CL
θSL
Then in Case 1, fH ≥ fL and cH ≤ cL, and we say that in this case, the “quality-
adjusted fixed cost” increases with quality upgrading, and the “quality-adjusted unit
variable cost” decreases with quality upgrading. In Case 2, the reverses hold.
4.1 Case 1: higher quality requires higher fixed cost (per unit
of quality) and involves lower variable cost (per unit of
quality)
We now consider Case 1, in which the following cost configuration holds:
fH ≥ fL and cH ≤ cL (40)
That is, the quality-adjusted fixed cost is higher for the high quality product, and the
quality-adjusted variable cost is lower for the high quality product. We assume that
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any firm j that has invested only FL is not able to produce the high-quality product.
Its output of the low quality product is denoted by xjL. In contrast, we assume that any
firm i that has invested FH can produce both quality levels. Its outputs are denoted
by xiH and x
i
L.
Let us establish an important Lemma:
Lemma 4 Assume cH ≤ cL. Any firm that has invested FH and is able to produce
both products will find it optimal to specialize in the high quality product.
Proof: see the appendix.
In what follows, we assume cH < cL (because the borderline case where cH = cL has
been considered in the previous section). Then, due to Lemma 4, all firms that have
invested FH will specialize in the high quality product, and all firms that have invested
FL will specialize in the low quality product.
Given nL and nH , the equilibrium outputs are
X∗H
N
=
(1− cH)nH(1 + nL)− k(1− cL)nHnL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL =
zHnH(1 + nL)− kzLnHnL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL (41)
X∗L
N
=
(1− cL)nL(1 + nH)− (1− cH)nHnL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL =
zLnL(1 + nH)− zHnHnL
1 + nH + nL + (1− k)nHnL (42)
where zi ≡ 1− ci, and zH > zL.
Now we must determine the equilibrium number of each type of firm, under free
entry. Zero profits imply(
1− X
∗
H
N
− kX
∗
L
N
− cH
)
X∗H
N
=
nHfH
N
≡ nHgH (43)
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− X
∗
L
N
− cL
)
X∗L
N
=
nLfL
N
≡ nLgL (44)
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From (43) we obtain
nH =
zH −
√
fH/N + nL
(
zH − kzL −
√
fH/N
)
(1 + nL(1− k))
√
fH/N
(45)
Using (44) and (45) we obtain
nL =
zL
√
β + nH(zL − zH)
√
β − zH
zH − kzL (46)
=
zL(
√
β + nH
√
β)− zH(1 + nH
√
β)
zH − kzL
In Diagram 1, Curve 2 depicts equation (46): it has a negative slope. Curve 1
depicts equation (45). Its slope is given by
dnH
dnL
=
k
[√
N
fH
(
CL
θSL
− CH
θSH
)
− 1
]
(1 + nL(1− k))2
This slope can be positive or negative. Thus we must consider two sub-cases
4.1.1 Subcase (i): Curve 1 has a negative slope (the market size is not too
large)
The slope of Curve 1 is negative if and only if
zH − zL ≡ cL − cH <
√
fH
N
(47)
i.e., if N is not too big. Assuming that condition (47) is satisfied, we can show that
the Curve 1 is strictly convex. Then Curve 1 and Curve 2 intersect at most once in the
positive orthant.
Diagram 1. Equilibrium number of the firms with different quality levels, downwards
sloping of Curve 1
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For a given nL, an increase in N will shift Curve 1 up.
The vertical intercept of Curve 1 is
y1 =
zH −√gH√
gH
(48)
this intercept is positive if and only if
zH >
√
gH (49)
and the horizontal intercept is
x1 =
zH −√gH√
gH − (zH − kzL) (50)
Assuming zH >
√
gH , the horizontal intercept is positive if and only if
zH −√gH < kzL (51)
Now, consider Curve 2. Since by assumption zH ≥ zL, at nH = 0, we have nL > 0
only if β is sufficiently large, such that√
β > zH − zL
29
We can rewrite eq (46) as follows:
nH =
(
zL
√
β − zH
)− nL(zH − kzL)
(zH − zL)
√
β
(52)
Curve 2 is a straight-line with negative slope. The vertical intercept of Curve 2 is
y2 =
(
zL
√
β − zH
)
(zH − zL)
√
β
(53)
This intercept is positive if and only if
zL
√
β − zH > 0 (54)
The horizontal intercept is
x2 =
zL
√
β − zH
(zH − kzL) (55)
It is positive iff zL
√
β − zH > 0.
In brief, there exists a unique equilibrium with nH > 0 and nL > 0 (as illustrated
by Diagram 1) if we assume the following conditions:
First, we require that y2 > y1 , i.e.
0 < cL − cH <
√
fH
N
−
√
fL
N
(56)
Second, we require that x1 > x2
zH −√gH√
gH − (zH − kzL) >
zL
√
β − zH
(zH − kzL) > 0 (57)
Recall that previously we have also made the following requirements12
zH −√gH > 0 (58)
12Note that if condition (56) is satisfied, than condition (59) is satisfied.
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√
gH − (zH − kzL) > 0 (59)
zL
√
β − zH > 0, i.e.
√
fH/fL >
zH
zL
≡ 1− cH
1− cL > 1 (60)
and
zH − zL > 0 i.e. cH < cL (61)
Equations (61) and (59) allow us to re-write (57) as
(zH − kzL) (zH −√gH)− (√gH − (zH − kzL))
(
zL
√
β − zH
)
> 0
which is equivalent to √
fH/N − k
√
fL/fH < zH − kzL (62)
i.e., √
fN√
N
< (1− cH)− k(1− cL) + k
√
fL
fH
(63)
Now consider a small increase in N . Curve 2 is not affected by N . An increase in N
will shift Curve 1 upwards. The result is that the intersection point of the two curves
will move up along Curve 2, implying an increase in the number of high quality firms
and a decrease in the number of low quality firms. The ratio X∗L/X
∗
H is, from (41) and
(42),
X∗L
X∗H
=
zL(
1
nH
+ 1)− zH
zH(
1
nL
+ 1)− kzL
When nL falls and nH rises, the denominator gets larger and the numerator gets smaller,
implying that in quantity terms, the market share of the low quality product falls.
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From the above analysis, we obtain the following Proposition, under the assumption
that Curve 1 has a negative slope, i.e.,
0 < cL − cH <
√
fH/N (64)
Proposition 2: Assume cH < cL, and cL − cH <
√
fH/N. There exists a unique
Cournot equilibrium with n∗H > 0 and n
∗
L > 0 such that each type of firms optimally
chooses to specialize in either the high or the low quality product, provided the additional
assumptions (i) to (v) below hold. Furthermore, an increase in the market size will
increase the number of high-quality firms, decrease the number of low-quality firms, and
decrease the market share of the low quality product.
(i) Large increment in fixed cost for quality upgrade, FH/SH > FL/SL
(ii) The higher quality product has higher unit variable cost, CH > CL, but lower
quality-adjusted unit variable cost, i.e., CH/SH < CL/SL.
(iii) The ratio of quality-adjusted fixed costs, fH/fL is sufficiently great relative to
the ratio (1− cH)/(1− cL), i.e. condition (60) holds.
(iv) The market size, N , is not too large:
1− cH >
√
fH
N
> (1− cH)− SL
SH
(1− cL) (65)
(v) Conditions (56) and (63) hold:
cL − cH <
√
fH
N
−
√
fL
N
(66)
√
fH
N
< (1− cH)− SL
SH
(1− cL) + k
√
fL
fH
(67)
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4.1.2 Subcase (ii): Curve 1 has a positive slope (The market size is large)
Now, we turn to the case where the slope of Curve 1 is positive. This is depicted in
Figure 6. Curve 1 has a non-negative slope if and only if
zH − zL ≡ cL − cH ≥
√
fH
N
(68)
Then, if condition (68) is met, we have
zH −√gH ≥ zL
where gH ≡ fHN , and the vertical intercept of Curve 1 is
y′1 =
zH −√gH√
gH
>
zL√
fH/N
> 0
If y′1 is equal to or smaller than y2 (the vertical intercept of Curve 2), then there will
be a unique intersection with both nL ≥ 0 and nH ≥ 0. Thus, if in addition to (68) we
assume that
y′1 ≡
zH −√gH√
gH
≤
(
zL
√
β − zH
)
(zH − zL)
√
β
≡ y2 (69)
then we have an interior Cournot equilibrium. Since we are dealing with the case where
zH > zL, condition (69) is equivalent to
zH − zL√
gH
≤
√
β − 1√
β
(70)
The right side of the inequality is less than one, i.e.
√
β−1√
β
< 1 . Recall that we have
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the condition zH −√gH ≥ zL, which implies that zH−zL√gH ≥ 1. Thus the inequality (70)
conflicts with condition (68). In this case, when the slope of Curve 1 is non-negative,
there are no non-negative solutions for nH and nL simultaneously.
4.2 Case 2: The higher quality product requires higher vari-
able cost (per unit of quality), but does not require a larger
fixed cost
Now we turn to the opposite case: FH = FL and CH/SH > CL/SL. Johnson and
Myatt (2006, Section 5, Proposition 9) show that if there are only two possible quality
levels with the identical fixed costs FH = FL = F , in equilibrium no firm restricts itself
to selling only the low quality product. Thus, in this case the industry consists of n
identical firms, each producing both products. Applying this result to our model, we
can solve for the equilibrium output of each product, given that the number of firms is
n, and the market size is N . The first order conditions for each firm are(
1− 1
N
XH
)
− XL
N
k − xiH
1
N
− xiL
1
N
k =
CH
θSH
(71)
−xHi
1
N
+
(
1− 1
N
XH − 1
N
XL
)
− xiL
1
N
=
CL
θSL
(72)
Subtracting equation (72) from equation (71), we obtain
CH
θSH
− CL
θSL
=
1
N
(XL + x
i
L) (1− k) > 0
Under symmetry, we have
xiL =
XL
n
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Then
cH − cL = XL
N
(
1 +
1
n
)
(1− k)
XL∗
N
=
cH − cL(
1 + 1
n
)
(1− k) > 0 (73)
Re-write eq. (72) as
1− XH
N
(
1 +
1
n
)
− XL
N
(
1 +
1
n
)
=
CL
θSL
(74)
Thus
XH
N
(
1 +
1
n
)
=
1− k + (kcL − cH)
1− k
X∗H
N
=
(1− k)− (cH − kcL)(
1 + 1
n
)
(1− k) (75)
Thus X∗H > 0 iff
cH − kcL < 1− k
iff
k <
1− cH
1− cL < 1 (76)
From (73) and (75), the ratio of low quality output to high quality output is independent
of the market size, N.
The prices are
P ∗H =
[
1− 1
N
X∗H −
k
N
X∗L
]
θSH (77)
P ∗L =
[
1− 1
N
X∗H −
1
N
X∗L
]
θSL (78)
Substituting (73) and (75) into (77) and (78) we obtain, after simplification,
P ∗H =
(
ncH + 1
n+ 1
)
θSH and P
∗
L =
(
ncL + 1
n+ 1
)
θSL (79)
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Then, since this subsection deals with the case where cL < cH , we obtain
P ∗L
θSL
=
ncL + 1
n+ 1
<
ncH + 1
n+ 1
=
P ∗H
θSH
and
P ∗L
P ∗H
=
k (ncL + 1)
(ncH + 1)
< 1
Thus, an increase in n leads to lower prices for both products, and a fall in the ratio
P ∗L/P
∗
H . The zero profit condition is
P ∗H
X∗H
N
+ P ∗L
X∗L
N
− CHX
∗
H
N
− CLX
∗
L
N
=
nF
N
(80)
This condition is equivalent to((
ncH + 1
n+ 1
)
θSH − CH
)(
1− k + (kcL − cH)(
1 + 1
n
)
(1− k)
)
+
((
ncL + 1
n+ 1
)
θSL − CL
)(
cH − cL(
1 + 1
n
)
(1− k)
)
=
nF
N
i.e., (
1− cH
n+ 1
)(
1− k + (kcL − cH)
(n+ 1)(1− k)
)
+ k
(
1− cL
n+ 1
)(
cH − cL
(n+ 1)(1− k)
)
=
F
NθSH
i.e.
∆
(1− k) (n+ 1)2 =
F
NθSH
where
∆ ≡ (1− cH) (1− k + (kcL − cH)) + k (1− cL) (cH − cL) > 0
Note that ∆ > 0 because we have assumed condition (76). The equilibrium number of
firms is
n∗ =
√
SHNθ∆
(1− k)F − 1
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A doubling of the market size will increase the number of firms, but by a smaller
proportion.
Proposition 3: Assume FL = FH = F , cH > cL,
SL
SH
< 1−cH
1−cL , and the fixed cost is
small relative to the market size N . Then
(i) in equilibrium, each will produce both low and high quality products.
(ii) the long-run equilibrium number of firms is uniquely determined. An increase
in the market size will lead to a larger number of firms.
(iii) an increase in the market size will reduce PH , PL, and also the relative price
PL/PH
(iv) an increase in the market size will reduce the value share of the low quality
products, PLXL/(PLXL + PHXH), but the ratio of outputs, XL/XH , is not affected by
the market size.
4.3 Discussions
Our results show that, under free entry and exit, in a Cournot oligopoly that produces
both high and low quality products, there are two main gains from an expansion of
the market size. First, the prices fall, and thus more consumers are served. Second,
the market share of the high quality product increases, which implies that on average,
consumers have greater access to the higher quality product. We may say that the
average quality rises. The mechanism differs, depending on the cost configuration. If
the quality-adjusted fixed cost is higher for the high quality product (fH > fL), and
firms must specialize in one of the products, then, in the case where the unit variable
costs (adjusted for quality) are the same, cH = cL, when the market size expands,
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more firms will enter the high-quality market segment, driving down the price PH , and
the low-quality product price PL also falls, but the ratio PL/PH is independent of the
market size.
When fH > fL but cH ≤ cL, we show that even though any firm that has incurred
FH is able to produce both products, it will refrain from doing so. This is true even if
the firm is making a short run output decision, and even if it is a monopoly (Lemma 4).
The reason is that it is not worthwhile for a firm that is capable to produce both goods
to produce the low quality product, at a high unit variable cost (adjusted for quality),
cL ≥ cH , to compete with its own high quality product. In other words the firm is
avoiding the phenomenon called ‘cannibalization: producing the low quality good will
lower its price, reducing the demand for the high quality product. It follows that the
assumption made in section 3 (that the high-quality firms produce only the high-quality
product, when cL = cH = c) is in fact justified. Considering the case where fH > fL
and cH < cL, we show that under some additional restrictions, a long run equilibrium
exists with two types of firms, each committed to specialize in one type of product.
When the market size expands, the effects are an increase the number of high-quality
firms, a decrease the number of low-quality firms, and a decrease the market share of
the low quality product.
We also consider the case where the fixed costs are the same for all firms regardless of
whether they produce the high quality product only, or the low quality product only, or
both products. In this case we show that all firms will produce both products, provided
that the quality adjusted unit variable cost of the high quality product is higher than
that of the low quality one, i.e., cH > cL. Thus the cannibalization effect is not too
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strong to discourage the production of the low quality good in this case. We show that
an increase in the market size will reduce PH , PL, and also reduce the relative price
PL/PH , as well as the value share of the low quality products, PLXL/(PLXL +PHXH),
however the ratio of the two outputs, XL/XH , is unaffected.
The following diagram (diagram 3) summarizes the relationships among cost struc-
ture, firms’ strategies, and market characteristics.
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Diagram 3. Cost structure, firms’ strategies, and the industrial structure
5 Some empirics
While this paper is primarily theoretical, in this section, we make a modest attempt to
bring the theory to the data. One of our theoretical prediction is that the price level is
lower for the larger market. Another result is that if the quality-adjusted unit variable
cost is higher for the high quality product, then an increase in the size of the market
will increase the market share of the high quality product. Using data covering China’s
exporting firms for the years 2002 to 2006, we test these predictions by exploring: (i)
the relationship between the average quality offered to an export market and the size
of that market, and (ii) the relationship between the price of a product offered by a
single firm and the size of the market. The data sets contains a wide range of variables
that are suitable for testing our hypotheses. These include the price of the products
supplied by each firm in each export market, the volume of transaction, and the category
of the products by the HS6 code. These data are obtained from the China’s General
Administration of Customs. In addition, we assemble the data that describe the macro
characteristics of the destination countries using the databases of the World Bank and
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the CEPII. These characteristics include population, GDP per capita, GINI coefficient
index, geographic distance between any two countries and the import tariffs imposed
by the destination countries. The table below describes the features of the data set.
Table 1. Data Description
VARIABLES Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ln(price) 17,564,024 0.937 2.027 -10.528 17.910
ln(quantity) 17,564,024 7.799 2.813 0 23.213
ln(price−average) 1,206,135 1.339 2.467 -9.861 17.281
ln(quantity−average) 1,206,135 9.276 3.661 0 24.091
ln(Tariff−rate) 654,765 0.0871 0.0928 0 2.785
ln(populatoin) 976 15.172 2.318 9.173 20.873
ln(GDP per capita) 893 8.998 1.268 6.362 11.683
ln(Gini) 294 3.641 0.257 2.785 4.171
ln(distance) 208 4.463 1.496 -0.00487 7.349
In our empirical specifications, we must modify the theory by adding the assumption
that exporting to a market requires the firm to incur a set-up cost for that market, and
this cost is increasing in the quality level of the products. We suppose that the export
set-up cost is country-specific, which may seem a reasonable assumption if tastes vary
across countries.13 Furthermore, since there are no direct statistics on quality levels,
we will use the average price, after controlling for the average quantity, as a measure
of the average quality. A modest justification of this approach is as follows.
We consider a log form relationship between average private and average quality,
based on the inverse demand functions for each type of product:
lnPj = lnSj + ln
[
1− f(Xj)
]
+ ln
(
θj
)
+ constant j (81)
where lnPj is the average of the logarithm of the prices of the products in market j, Xj
is the average quantity of the products14, lnSj is the average of the logarithm of the
13Di Comite et al. (2014) provide empirical support for this hypothesis.
14In the estimation, for simplicity we use the average value (in logarithm) to control this term.
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quality of the products, which is expected to be an increasing function of the market
size. The Appendix provides some justification for this formulation.
The actual test involves running the following regression model
lnPjkt = β1 ln (sizekt) + β2 lnXjkt + Z
′
ktγ + ηj + ζt + εjkt (82)
where lnPjkt is the average of log of price for variety j in country k in year t, ln (sizekt)
indexes the market size,lnXjkt is the log of average quantity of the product group j
exported to market k in year t, Zkt controls other characteristics of the destination
markets, ηj is the industry fixed effect, and ζt is the time fixed effect. The estimation
results ( see the first and second columns of Table 2 below) show that the average price
in each country-industrial sector is increasing in the market size. 15
Next, we test the relationship between the price level offered by a single firm to a
market and the size of that market. Using equations (36) and (37), we construct the
log form relation between the price level offered by firm i to market j as follows:
lnPij = lnSi +
1
2
ln fi − 1
2
ln(1− c)− 1
2
lnNj (83)
Then the regression model is specified as follows:
lnPijt = β1 lnNjt + Z
′
jtγ + ηi + ζt + εijt (84)
15 Based on our theoretical settings, we use the population size as the measure of the market size to
run our main regressions. We also check the robustness when using the real GDP as the indicator for
market size and controlling for all the control variables. The estimation results are consistent with our
main regressions. We also run the regressions using the log of average price as our dependent variable,
i.e. lnPjkt . The estimation results are consistent with our main regressions.
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where lnPijt is the price level offered by firm i to market j at time t, lnNjt is the
market size of country j at time t, Zit controls the macro characteristics of market j,
ηi controls the firm-level fixed effects, and ζt controls the time fixed effects. The results
(see the third and forth columns of Table 2 below) show that the firm-country-level
price is decreasing in the market size.
Table 2. Product price and the market size
Dependent variables Log of price Log of price
Country-variety level Firm-country-variety level
ln(populatoin) 0.105*** 0.138*** -0.00527*** -0.00499***
(0.00278) (0.00409) (0.00153) (0.00138)
ln(quantity) -0.111*** -0.136***
(0.00229) (0.00276)
ln(distance) -0.00253 -0.0285*** 0.0303*** 0.00764***
(0.00242) (0.00414) (0.00177) (0.00201)
ln(Tariff−rate) -1.079*** -0.456*** -0.239*** -0.0509***
(0.0288) (0.0318) (0.0218) (0.0168)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.164*** 0.0413***
(0.00496) (0.00298)
ln(Gini) -0.319*** -0.0953***
(0.0157) (0.00799)
Observations 638,781 196,939 6,928,948 1,256,626
Adj R-squared 0.887 0.903 0.908 0.931
Variety-time FE YES YES
Firm-variety-time FE YES YES
Standard errors are clustered at industrial level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the Cournot equilibrium of an oligopoly with multiple product qual-
ity under free entry and exit. The paper highlights the dependence of prices and average
quality on the market size. Firms must incur a set-up cost. In the first stage of the
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game, each decides whether it will produce the low quality product or the high quality
product. If the set-up cost is independent of product quality, firms may choose to sup-
ply both types of quality. We show that for the existence of an equilibrium where some
firms specialize in the low quality product it is necessary that the set-up cost for the
lower quality product, adjusted for quality level, is lower than that for the higher qual-
ity product. In the case where the unit variable costs are zero, or they are proportional
to quality level (so that unit variable costs, adjusted for quality, are the same), we show
that an increase in the market size leads to (i) an increase in the fraction of firms that
specialize in the high quality products, (ii) the market shares (both in value terms and
in terms of volume of output) of high quality producers increases, and (iii) the prices of
both types of product decrease. In the case where higher quality requires higher set-up
cost (per unit of quality) but lower unit variable cost (per unit of quality), subject to
certain bounds on the difference in unit variable costs, we obtain the result that an
increase in the market size decreases the number of low quality firms, increases the
number of high quality firms, and decreases the prices of both products. In the special
case where the set-up cost is independent of the quality level, we find that all firms will
produce both quality levels. In this case, an increase in the market size will reduce the
value share of low quality products, but will leave their volume share unchanged. Both
the relative price PL/PH and the nominal prices PH and PL fall.
We carried out an empirical test of a version of the model, where set-up costs now
refer to set-up costs to establish an export market, and they vary according to the
quality of the product that the firm exports to that market. We show that the data
supported the hypothesis that the private price for a single firm are lower and average
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qualities of the product are higher for bigger export markets.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
The inverse demand functions are
PH =
(
1− 1
N
XH
)
θSH − XL
N
θSL
PL =
(
1− 1
N
XH − 1
N
XL
)
θSL
Suppose firm i has incurred the fixed cost FH in stage 1. Then in stage 2, firm i’s
optimization problem is to choose xiH ≥ 0 and xiL ≥ 0 to maximize
(PH − CH)xiH + (PL − CL)xiL
The F.O.C. with respect to xiH is
(PH − CH) + xiH
∂PH
∂XH
+ xiL
∂PL
∂XH
≤ 0 ( = 0 if xiH > 0)
and the F.O.C. with respect to xiL is
xiH
∂PH
∂XL
+ (PL − CL) + xiL
∂PL
∂XL
≤ 0 ( = 0 if xiL > 0)
Thus, if both xiH and x
i
L are positive, then we must have(
1− 1
N
XH
)
θSH − XL
N
θSL − CH − xiH
1
N
θSH − xiL
1
N
θSL = 0
−xHi
1
N
θSL +
(
1− 1
N
XH − 1
N
XL
)
θSL − CL − xiL
1
N
θSL = 0
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i.e., with k = SL/SH < 1,(
1− 1
N
XH
)
− XL
N
k − CH
θSH
− xiH
1
N
− xiL
1
N
k = 0
−xHi
1
N
+
(
1− 1
N
XH − 1
N
XL
)
− CL
θSL
− xiL
1
N
= 0
i.e., (
1− 1
N
XH
)
− XL
N
k − xiH
1
N
− xiL
1
N
k =
CH
θSH
(A.1)
−xHi
1
N
+
(
1− 1
N
XH − 1
N
XL
)
− xiL
1
N
=
CL
θSL
(A.2)
Subtracting (A.2) from (A.1) and using eq. (39) we obtain
CH
θSH
− CL
θSL
=
1
N
(XL + x
i
L) (1− k) > 0
which cannot hold, since we have assumed that CH
θSH
− CL
θSL
≤ 0. Q.E.D.
Justification for equation (81)
Let us explain how we arrived at equation (81). Using the results in our theoretical
part, we have the following inverse demand functions in log forms
lnPH = lnSH + ln θ + ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− kX
∗
L
N
)
(A.3)
lnPL = lnSL + ln θ + ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− X
∗
L
N
)
(A.4)
We define the average value of any variable y (be it price, quantity, or quality) by
y =
nH
nH + nL
yH +
nL
nH + nL
yL
Then
X =
nH
nH + nL
X∗H +
nL
nH + nL
X∗L
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From (A.3) and (A.4)
nH lnPH = nH lnSH + nH ln θ + nH ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− kX
∗
L
N
)
nL lnPL = nL lnSL + nL ln θ + nL ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− X
∗
L
N
)
Adding these two equations, and dividing both sides by nH + nL, we get
lnP = lnS + ln θ +
nH
nH + nL
ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− kX
∗
L
N
)
+
nL
nH + nL
ln
(
1− X
∗
H
N
− X
∗
L
N
)
(A.5)
Then eq (A.5) can be rearranged as follows
lnP = lnS + ln
(
θ
)
+ ln
[
1−
(
X∗H
N
+
X∗L
N
)]
+RH ln v (A.6)
where RH ≡ nH/(nH + nL) and
v ≡ 1−
X∗H
N
− kX∗L
N
1− X∗H
N
− X∗L
N
> 1
Recall that in we have found that there is a monotone increasing (but not linear)
relationship between the equilibrium number of firms, nH + nL, and the market size.
Therefore we can approximate the term
(
X∗H
N
+
X∗L
N
)
in eq. (A.6) by some function
f(X).
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